文章摘要
魏红珊.论近代川边治理与国防安全:从赵尔丰到刘文辉[J].民族学刊,2019,10(6):61-70, 127-129
论近代川边治理与国防安全:从赵尔丰到刘文辉
On Border Management and National Defense Security in Modern Sichuan:From Zhao Erfeng to Liu Wenhui
  
DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1674-9391.2019.06.08
中文关键词: 近代  川边治理  国防安全  赵尔丰  刘文辉
英文关键词: modern time  border governance  national defense safety  Sichuan border  Zhao Erfeng  Liu Wenhui
基金项目:
作者单位
魏红珊 四川省社会科学院 
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中文摘要:
      风云激荡的近代“川边”,历任主政者的川边治理成效殊异:赵尔丰籍“平康三策”,锐意进取,开拓出广阔的川边境域,成功践行“固川保藏”方略。尹昌衡藉个人英雄主义维持短暂的绚烂;其后走马灯式的镇守使无法掌控川边局势,失地溃败;颇具政治韬略的刘文辉,妥善处理民族关系,稳固川边,促使西康成功建省。34年的川边治理为现代西南边疆治理留下了鲜活的经验教训,川滇藏结合部需要新的边疆治理统筹。
英文摘要:
      The “Sichuan Border” was originally an abstract name for the area, until later when Zhao Erfeng (1845-1911) pacified the chaos that happened there and opened an administrative area managed by the Sichuan-Yunnan Border Affairs minister. Standing at the height of national strategy, and taking the “pingkang sance”, or the “Three Strategies for Pacifying the Kham Area”, as guidance, Zhao Erfeng pursued an overall defense of the southwest border, which set a strong foundation for the modern governance of the Sichuan border area. Starting as a military expedition, Zhao Erfeng went from southern Kham through northern Kham, then to west of Salween River, securing a vast realm in the previously chaotic “Sichuan Border” area. This realm, extended west to the Danda Mountains, east to Luding, north to Yushu, the habitat of 25 ethnic peoples, south to the area ruled by Lijiang fu, then to the area west of Chamuduo occupied by 39 ethnic groups, and finally to the area along the line of Bianba, Bomi, Sangqu’angzong, and Zayu. Zhao Erfeng changed the “Sichuan border” area from a geographical name into an actual provincial area, uniting today’s Sichuan, Yunnan and Tibet. It formed a “fist of inland national defense that could reach out of the border area, directly watching “British India”, “British Myanmar” and “Tibetan Independence” separatists at point blank distance. He escorted the Sichuan Army into Tibet to guard the border and sent Cheng Fengxiang’s army directly to attack Chayu. In doing so, he successfully protected the territorial integrity of the southwest border. In the early period of the Republic of China, when again there was chaos and upheaval in the “Sichuan Border” area, Yin Changheng promptly initiated an expedition to the west to take back the lost land. Afterwards, when Britain manipulated the meeting of the Simla Accord in order to split Tibet and encroach on China’ territory, because the vast west of Jinsha River was, in reality, controlled by China, China refuted and rejected the shameful Simla Accord. Yin Changheng’s governance was a recovery and reinforcement of Zhao Erfeng’s national defense at the “Sichuan Border”. Several “Sichuan Border Defense Generals” afterwards performed poorly, among which Chen Xialing lost almost half of the land. In 1931, the Tibetan army kept marching east, and occupied Zhanhua and Ganzi. Liu Wenhui hastily assembled an army to drive the Tibetan army back to west of the Jinsha River. Then, the two sides assigned the “Gangtuo Agreement”, which established the Jinsha River as the boundary. Liu recaptured a vast amount of the land lost since 1918, but this amount did not include the land which had been expanded by Zhao Erfeng previously. Ever since then, Liu Wenhui’s governance of Kham and the establishment of Kham Province were limited to east of the Jinsha River. As for border governance and ethnic relationships, both Zhao Erfeng and Liu Wenhui had their own strengths. Zhao started from nothing. Politically, he continued the policy of gaituguiliu, or replacement of native officials with royally appointed officials, with tough approach, and set up county and basic administration. Economically, he established separate treatments for land issue, livestock, farming, tax, Wula, mining, industry, post, communication and currency respectively. Culturally and concerning religion, he developed education, set up education and medical bureaus, and controlled the size of temples, etc. However, he mistakenly implemented a forced assimilation policy, which aggravated ethnic conflict and contradictions. Whereas Liu Wenhui advocated the philosophy of “ethnic equality”, respected ethnic minority cultures and reinforced the connections between ethnic groups. He encouraged economic growth, developed education in the border area, decreased burden to improve people’s lives and trained officials with effort, and wiped out corruption. These were generally correct moves. As for national defense, Zhao Erfeng had an overall prospective when he united Sichuan, Tibet and Yunnan into a national defense system. He personally introduced actual national sovereignty (army and government) into the “Sichuan border” area, the western part of Yunnan and places under the jurisdiction of the local government of Tibet. By doing so, he affected the attempts of Britain and “Tibet authorities” to split Tibet from China. He expedited the guarding of southern Tibet and western Yunnan and in those vital points near central Tibet he sent competitive officers and a well-trained army which were the solid security protecting the safety of the southwest border and which could threaten the “Tibetan Independence” separatists. Both the overall strategy and practical implementation could be regarded as perfect. Liu Wenhui was good at political tactics, so he set Jinsha River as the boundary with the Tibetan army, and eventually facilitated the foundation of Xikang Province or Kham province. Given the fact that Britain instigated “Tibetan independence” in modern times, the “Sichuan border” area was the actual border at the end of Qing Dynasty and into the Republic of China. Therefore, the gaituguiliu policy and the integrated governance of the “Sichuan border” was the first step in stopping Tibetan army from marching east. After the initial success in the governance of the “Sichuan border”, with integrated politics and a strong army at hand, Zhao Erfeng marched west into the center of Tibet and south to the Yunnan-Tibet boundary in order to intimidate “Tibetan independence” and claim sovereignty at the border. This served as a preparation for the second step, to establish the Southwest Border Defense Governor’s Office at Batang. There were two vital strategic points of great significance when confronting the Tibetan army, namely Changdu in the north and Batang in the south. Batang was originally retrieved and operated by Zhao Erfeng, and was held in Chinese army’s hand during entire time of the “Sichuan frontier” (Kham) governance. This guaranteed the safety of transportation from the south to Kangding. Changdu was the stronghold where Zhao Erfeng was stationed when he escorted the Sichuan army into Tibet via the Ningjing Mountains to threaten the Tibetan army, which was then stationed by the “Sichuan border” army by long term. Changdu was lost during the conflict between Kham and Tibet in 1918. The Tibetan army invaded rapidly and captured vast lands in northern Kham. They set up Changdu as their headquarters to manage the area northeast of Tibet, confronting the Chinese army over a long period of time, until the Changdu Campaign in 1950. Within the background of modern times, the western part of the southwestern border of China starts from Ali in Tibet, and extends south to Wenshan prefecture in Yunnan. This is the most controversial border line, the central area of which is the juncture of Sichuan, Yunnan and Tibet, also known as the contemporary “Sichuan border”. Judging from the experience of the governance of the “Sichuan border”, the peace of the “Sichuan border” is the premise and guarantee of southwestern safety and security. Now the prefecture-level administrative centers surrounding Kham are Kangding, Changdu, Linzhi and Lijiang. Lijiang and Changdu are approximately 1000km apart latitudinally, and Kangding and Linzhi are approximately 1670km apart longitudinally. There is no central city in the vast space between them. As for the southern-Tibet and western-Yunnan border line, it is also distant from any prefecture-level city. Between the two strategic fulcrums of the contemporary “Sichuan border”, namely Changdu in the north and Batang in the south, Changdu is still the regional center of northeastern Tibet, but Batang has been downgraded to an ordinary county town. Reflecting on the contemporary “Sichuan border” governance, not only did Zhao Erfeng’s “Three Schemes for Pacifying Kham” make Batang a priority, but also two General Officers of Sichuan and Shaanxi, Nian Gengyao and Zhongqi Yue, both thought highly of Batang’s strategic importance in the national defense. Nowadays Sichuan, Kham and Tibet form an inseparable entity to protect the safety and security of the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau. In the vast central region along the southwest border line, Batang is needed as an important strategic point to connect the southwest border and to take worthy responsibility in national defense.
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